macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms - HackTricks

# macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms

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> [!WARNING] Note that entitlements starting with `com.apple` are not available to third-parties, only Apple can grant them.

## High

### `com.apple.rootless.install.heritable`

The entitlement `com.apple.rootless.install.heritable` allows to bypass SIP. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.rootless.install`

The entitlement `com.apple.rootless.install` allows to bypass SIP. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.system-task-ports` (previously called `task_for_pid-allow`)

This entitlement allows to get the task port for any process, except the kernel. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.security.get-task-allow`

This entitlement allows other processes with the `com.apple.security.cs.debugger` entitlement to get the task port of the process run by the binary with this entitlement and inject code on it. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.security.cs.debugger`

Apps with the Debugging Tool Entitlement can call `task_for_pid()` to retrieve a valid task port for unsigned and third-party apps with the `Get Task Allow` entitlement set to `true`. However, even with the debugging tool entitlement, a debugger can’t get the task ports of processes that don’t have the `Get Task Allow` entitlement, and that are therefore protected by System Integrity Protection. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation`

This entitlement allows to load frameworks, plug-ins, or libraries without being either signed by Apple or signed with the same Team ID as the main executable, so an attacker could abuse some arbitrary library load to inject code. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.private.security.clear-library-validation`

This entitlement is very similar to `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` but instead of directly disabling library validation, it allows the process to call a `csops` system call to disable it.
Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables`

This entitlement allows to use DYLD environment variables that could be used to inject libraries and code. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.private.tcc.manager` or `com.apple.rootless.storage`.`TCC`

According to this blog and this blog, these entitlements allows to modify the TCC database.

### `system.install.apple-software` and `system.install.apple-software.standar-user`

These entitlements allows to install software without asking for permissions to the user, which can be helpful for a privilege escalation.

### `com.apple.private.security.kext-management`

Entitlement needed to ask the kernel to load a kernel extension.

### `com.apple.private.icloud-account-access`

The entitlement `com.apple.private.icloud-account-access` it's possible to communicate with `com.apple.iCloudHelper` XPC service which will provide iCloud tokens.

iMovie and Garageband had this entitlement.

For more information about the exploit to get icloud tokens from that entitlement check the talk: #OBTS v5.0: "What Happens on your Mac, Stays on Apple's iCloud?!" - Wojciech Regula

### `com.apple.private.tcc.manager.check-by-audit-token`

TODO: I don't know what this allows to do

### `com.apple.private.apfs.revert-to-snapshot`

TODO: In this report is mentioned that this could be used to update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!

### `com.apple.private.apfs.create-sealed-snapshot`

TODO: In this report is mentioned that this could be used to update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!

### `keychain-access-groups`

This entitlement list keychain groups the application has access to:

    <key>keychain-access-groups</key>
    <array>
            <string>ichat</string>
            <string>apple</string>
            <string>appleaccount</string>
            <string>InternetAccounts</string>
            <string>IMCore</string>
    </array>

### `kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles`

Gives Full Disk Access permissions, one of the TCC highest permissions you can have.

### `kTCCServiceAppleEvents`

Allows the app to send events to other applications that are commonly used for automating tasks. Controlling other apps, it can abuse the permissions granted to these other apps.

Like making them ask the user for its password:

    osascript -e 'tell app "App Store" to activate' -e 'tell app "App Store" to activate' -e 'tell app "App Store" to display dialog "App Store requires your password to continue." & return & return default answer "" with icon 1 with hidden answer with title "App Store Alert"'

Or making them perform arbitrary actions.

### `kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient`

Allows, among other permissions, to write the users TCC database.

### `kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles`

Allows to change the `NFSHomeDirectory` attribute of a user that changes his home folder path and therefore allows to bypass TCC.

### `kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppBundles`

Allow to modify files inside apps bundle (inside app.app), which is disallowed by default.

It's possible to check who has this access in System Settings > Privacy & Security > App Management.

### `kTCCServiceAccessibility`

The process will be able to abuse the macOS accessibility features, Which means that for example he will be able to press keystrokes. SO he could request access to control an app like Finder and approve the dialog with this permission.

## Medium

### `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit`

This entitlement allows to create memory that is writable and executable by passing the `MAP_JIT` flag to the `mmap()` system function. Check this for more info.

### `com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory`

This entitlement allows to override or patch C code, use the long-deprecated `NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory` (which is fundamentally insecure), or use the DVDPlayback framework. Check this for more info.

> [!CAUTION] Including this entitlement exposes your app to common vulnerabilities in memory-unsafe code languages. Carefully consider whether your app needs this exception.

### `com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection`

This entitlement allows to modify sections of its own executable files on disk to forcefully exit. Check this for more info.

> [!CAUTION] The Disable Executable Memory Protection Entitlement is an extreme entitlement that removes a fundamental security protection from your app, making it possible for an attacker to rewrite your app’s executable code without detection. Prefer narrower entitlements if possible.

### `com.apple.security.cs.allow-relative-library-loads`

TODO

### `com.apple.private.nullfs_allow`

This entitlement allows to mount a nullfs file system (forbidden by default). Tool: mount_nullfs.

### `kTCCServiceAll`

According to this blogpost, this TCC permission usually found in the form:

    [Key] com.apple.private.tcc.allow-prompting
    	[Value]
    		[Array]
    			[String] kTCCServiceAll

Allow the process to ask for all the TCC permissions.

### `kTCCServicePostEvent`

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